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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE PAROL
RELEASE OF A MORTGAGE
By PAuL HARDIN III*
In Stevens v. Turlington,1 a North Carolina case, plaintiff, a
prospective purchaser of mortgaged premises, went to defendant,
the mortgagee, and secured her verbal agreement to release from
the operation of her mortgage the land which plaintiff wished to
buy. The mortgagee promised to accept in lieu thereof a mortgage
on another tract of land. Plaintiff bought the land in question, and
a mortgage on the other tract was tendered to defendant. She
refused the tender and offered the land at a mortgage sale, where- -
upon plaintiff brought an action to quiet title and to restrain de-
fendant from executing a deed of the property. The court held that
an unexecuted verbal agreement, made by a mortgagee for a valu-
able consideration, to release land from the operation of a mortgage
is not within the statute of frauds and affirmed judgment for
plaintiff.
Again, in Leavitt v. Pratt,2 a Maine case, the purchaser of mort-
gaged land paid his purchase money on the mortgagee's verbal
agreement to release the mortgage. The court held the agreement
unenforceable as within the statute of frauds, and the mortgagee
was allowed to foreclose.
The two cases abstracted illustrate the wide split of authority on
the question whether or not a verbal agreement, executed or execu-
tory, made by a mortgagee to release his mortgage is enforceable as
against the statute of frauds.3
No satisfactory theory has been or, it is submitted, can be ad-
vanced which will reconcile all ol the cases. One suggestion fre-
quently made is that the difference of opinion is based upon the
views taken in the various states as to the nature of a mortgage.4
Supposedly, the distinction is that in some states the mortgagee is
considered as having title to the mortgaged premises, while in others
he is considered as having a mere lien or security interest. Follow-
* 2d year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke University, 1952.
1 186 N. 0 g191, 119 S. 1. 210, 32 A. L. R. 870 (1923).
2 53 Me. 147 (1865).
3 See note, 32 A. L. R. 874 (1924), for an excellent review of the decisions.
'32 A. L. 1. 874 (1924), 49 Am. Jun. § 202, p. 528.
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ing through with that theory, a writing is required in the former
group of states and not in the latter. This assumes a consistency
of attitude which does not exist in either title or lien theory states.5
Jones has listed North Carolina as a "title" state and Oklahoma
and Oregon as "lien" states;6 yet, the North Carolina court does
not require a writing,7 while those of Oklahoma s and Oregon9 do
require a writing for the release of a mortgage. In commenting on
this inconsistency one text writer said:
"The North Carolina court 'adheres to' the title doctrine,
at the same time arguing that the mortgagee's 'title' is not
such an interest in realty as to require a writing for its re-
transfer to the mortgagor. The title or lien label, as has ap-
peared and will appear, is neither wholly without meaning
nor wholly without influence on decisions. But its signifi-
cance and effect can be grasped only by exact analysis from
case to case and from state to state."' 1
Another theory has been advanced to the effect that an unexe-
cuted agrement to release a mortgage is within the statute but an
executed release is not within it." However, as one court has
pointed out, the cases cited by Corpus Juris in support of that
theory are most unsatisfactory, 2 and many of the cases which have
held that a writing is not necessary involved an unexecuted agree-
ment to release.' 3 This theory, then, is also untenable.
In the early English case of Richards v. Syms, Syms borrowed
money of Richards and gave a mortgage securing his bond. A few
This has been most graphically illustrated by a review of the random
remarks of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Sturges and Clark, Legal
Theory and Beal Property Mortgages, 37 YALE L. J. 691, 710 et seq. (1928).
0 1 JONES MORTGAGES, § 49, 52, 53, 67 (8th ed., 1928).
Hemmings v. Doss, 125 N. C. 400, 34 S. E. 511 (1899); Stevens v. Tur-
lington, 186 N. C. 191, 119 S. E. 210, 32 A. L. 1. 870 (1923); Hare v. Hare,
208 N. C. 442, 181 S. E. 246 (1935).
s Oklahoma Farm Mortgage Co. v. Cesar, 178 Okla. 451, 62 P. 2d 1269
(1936).
o Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Toliver, 152 Ore. 185, 52 P. 2d 1129
(1936).10 HANNA, CASES AND MATEgIALS ow SECURITY, p. 541 (2d ed., 1952).
2 alins v. Brown, 4 N. Y. 403 (1850); 27 C. J. § 201, p. 218, notes 57, 59;
37 C. J. S. § 118, p. 611, notes 92, 94.
12 Degheri v. Carobine, 100 N. J. Eq. 493, 500, 135 Atl. 518, 521 (1927).
1 Hemmings v. Doss, supra, note 7; Stevens v. Turington, supra, note 1;
Hare v. Hare, supra, note 7; Riley v. Atherton, 185 Ark. 425, 47 S. W. 2d 568
(1932); Schweider v. Lang, 29 Minn. 254, 13 N. W. 33, 43 Am. Rep. 202
(1882).
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years later Richards told Syms to take back the writings, that he
freely forgave the debt. Richards died and his heir brought a bill
against Syms to compel him to pay the debt or to stand foreclosed.
The court, in holding that the evidence of the parol forgiving of the
debt was admissible despite the statute of frauds, said in part:
"But where a mortgage is made of an estate, that is only
considered as a security for money due, the land is the acci-
dent attending upon the other; and when the debt is dis-
charged, the interest in the land follows of course. In lau
the interest in the land is thereby defeated, and in equity a
trust arises for the benefit of the mortgagor.' ,14
This case has been widely followed in this country, thus giving
rise to a third theory. As Professor Williston expresses it:
"The distinction between a transfer of land by operation
of law and by act of the parties is important also in relation
to contracts to discharge encumbrances. A contract to pay a
debt or to accept payment by way of accord and satisfac-
tion, or otherwise, is not within the Statute, though the effect
of such payment may be to discharge a mortgage, and thereby
transfer an interest in land to the mortgagor. On the other
hand, an express promise by a mortgagee to surrender or
discharge his mortgage, insofar as this involves anything
more than accepting payment of the debt, is within the
Statute. Whether a contract by a mortgagee to discharge a
mortgage means anything more in a particular case than a
contract to accept satisfaction of his debt is a question of
interpretation .. ."15
This theory of release by operation of law might well explain a
large number of cases. However, release agreements have been held
not to be within the statute even though the debt remains outstand-
ing,16 and even in cases in which the debt was satisfied the courts
have not been content to rest their decisions on operation of law.1
Logically, there can be no doubt that a release of a mortgage or
a contract to release a mortgage is within the statute of frauds. A
14 Barn. Ch. 90, 93, 27 Eng. Repr. 567, 568 (1740).
2 WILwsi.T, CONTRACTS, § 492, p. 1420 (rev. ed., 1936).
"Hemmings v. Doss, Stevens v. Turlington, Hare v. Hare, supra, note 7;
Ackla v. Aekla, 6 Pa. 228 (1847).
117 In Biley v. Atherton, 185 Ark. 425, 426, 47 S. W. 2d 568 (1932), the
court did not mention operation of law but used instead this broad language:
"in this and in many other states a mortgage is considered as security for the
debt merely and not the principal obligation. An oral agreement to satisfy,
therefore, does not fall within the statute of frauds."
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mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in real property within the
meaning of the statute of frauds, and a contract to give a mortgage
is a contract for the sale of an interest in real property within the
meaning of the statute.'8 The logical corollary to that statement
is that the release of a mortgage is a conveyance of an interest in
real property within the statute of frauds, and a contract to release
a mortgage is a contract for the sale of an interest in real property
within the statute. There in an abundance of authority for that
position, 19 and, indeed, it seems so obviously true that the Massa-
chusetts court was prompted to remark:
"We are called on to enjoin against the use of a mortgage
deed, by verbal proof that the respondent had given up his
estate. The proposition is self-evidently false." 
20
If the purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent frauds and
perjuries, is it to be supposed that it was intended to prevent evilly
disposed persons from swearing into being a non-existent mortgage,
or contract to mortgage, and yet not to prevent evilly disposed per-
sons from swearing into being a non-existent release, or agreement
to release?
Despite the apparent logic and respectable authority favoring
the view that the release of a mortgage is within the statute of
frauds, it is doubtful that there is a single fact situation for which
there is no authority favoring the contrary proposition. Indeed,
in what would appear to be the numerical majority of cases the
18 SIeeth v. Sampson, 237 N. Y. 69, 142 N. E. 355, 30 A. L. R. 1400 (1923).
19 Dodson v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 236 Ala. 111, 181 So. 492 (1938);
Hunt v. Maynard, 6 Pick. 489 (Mass., 1828); Parker v. Barker, 2 Mete. 423
(Mass., 1841) ; Duff v. United States Trust Co., 327 Mass. 17, 97 N. E. 2d 189
(1951); Leavitt v. Pratt, 53 Me. 147 (1865); Joseph S. Naame Co. v. Louis
Satanov Real Estate & Mortgage Corporation, 103 N. J. Eq. 386, 143 Atl. 531
(1928); George v. Meinersmann, 119 N. J. L. 460, 197 Atl. 1 (1938); Okla-
homa Farm Mortgage Co. v. Cesar, 178 Okla. 451, 62 P. 2d 1269 (1936) ; Union
Central Life Ins. Co. v. Toliver, 152 Ore. 185, 52 P. 2d 1129 (1936); Merrill
v. Pease, 51 Vt. 556 (1878).
20 Hunt v. Maynard, supra, note 19. The writer of one law review article
has criticized the Massachusetts court for depending merely upon the self-
evidency of the proposition and failing to answer the contention that the mort-
gage was extinguished by operation of law. Appel, Parol Belease of a Mort-
gage, 42 Diox. L. REv. 226, 230 (1938). The answer is that in the Massachu-
setts case, the debt by the parol agreement, was to remain in full effect and only
the mortgage was to be discharged. Hence, it was not even an appropriate case
for the application of the operation of law concept. The error of the law
review writer emphasizes the importance of case to case examination and the
fallibility of attempting to cover the whole field with a single theory.
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courts have held on one theory or another that an agreement to
release a mortgage, executed or executory, need not be in writing.
One of the devices employed by a few courts has already been
referred to. In many cases the agreement to release has been ac-
companied, preceded, or followed by payment or other satisfaction
of the debt. That circumstance opens the way for the courts to
adopt the operation of law theory and say with the Illinois court:
"The payment or discharge of the debt, evidenced by the notes,
operates to release the mortgage, which is but an incident to the
debt.'" 2 1 This theory has been analogized by Professor Williston to
the view which seems to be almost universally accepted in this coun-
try that the assignment of the debt by the mortgagee takes with it
the mortgage, which is but an incident to the debt and cannot stand
alone. 22 The theory seems tenable enough; but, as we have seen, it
can be applied only in those situations in which the debt is satisfied.
In those courts which hold that a release is within the statute
of frauds it may frequeutly be taken out of its operation by the
doctrine of part performance. An illuminating case is Oklahoma
Farm Mortgage Co. v. Cesar.2 3 There the promise to release was
made to third parties who intended to purchase parts of the mort-
gaged property from the mortgagor. The agreement was enforced
in favor of the purchaser who paid part of the purchase price to
the mortgagor in reliance on the mortgagee's promise and entered
and made improvements. It was not enforced in favor of the pur-
chaser to whom the same promise was made and who made improve-
ments, but who did not pay any of the purchase price. In the
New York case of Malins v. Brown2 4 precisely the same agreement
was involved, and the court held that payment by the purchaser
of the purchase money and his being let into possession were suffi-
cient to take the case out of the operation of the statute. It would
seem, then, that in a jurisdiction which recognizes the doctrine of
part performance a purchaser who has paid part of his purchase
money and gone into possession stands in a fair way to escape the
statute of frauds.
Another means of enforcing a parol release or agreement to
release is the rather nebulous doctrine of equitable estoppel. Cer-
tain factors being present, it is said, the mortgagee is estopped to
21 Mutual Mill Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 121 f1I. 366, 375, 12 N. E. 747, 750 (1887).
22 WILLISToN, op. cit. supra, note 15.
23 Supra, note 8.
24 Supra, note 11.
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set up the statute of frauds. Just what these factors are is involved
in some mystery. One court said by way of dicttm that the doc-
trine is applicable any time a purchaser buys land from a mort-
gagor, relying on the mortgagee's promise to release that land from
the operation of his mortgage.2 5 A Pennsylvania case has appar-
ently gone so far as to indicate that actual reliance is not necessary,
it being enough to say that the purchaser might reasonably have
relied on the promise.26
Finally, a few courts have held, quite apart from any doctrine
of operation of law, part performance, or equitable estoppel, that
the release of a mortgage is not within the statute of frauds. In
Stevens v. Tur ington2 7 a parol promise to release was enforced.
The debt was not paid, so the operation of law concept would be of
no avail. Under the cases we have considered on part performance
the requisite elements might have been present, but the court made
no mention of that doctrine. Equitable estoppel was the subject of
one brief paragraph of the opinion, but the court did not indicate
that the decision turned on that principle. North Carolina is a title
state,28 so any argument to the effect that a mere lien can be released
without a writing would be of no avail. The court discussed in
detail the nature of a mortgage and concluded that:
" ... until foreclosure, or at least until possession is taken,
the mortgage, as a general rule, is regarded in the light of a
chose in action, to be dealt with according to the principles
of equity." 29
Acida v. Ackla, a ease in which the court also talked equitable
estoppel, was decided on the same ground as the North Carolina
case. The Pennsylvania court in the Ackla case said that a mort-
gage is simply
a chose in action extinguishable by a parol release,
which equity will execute as an agreement not to sue, or by
turning the mortgagee into a trustee for the mortgagor."30
The reasoning of the courts which hold unequivocally that the
release of a mortgage is not within the statute of frauds seems to
be merely that the mortgage is only the security for the debt and
Stevens v. Turlington, supra, note 1.
. Ackla v. Ackla, supra, note 16.2 Supra, note 1. 28 JoN E, op. cit. supra, note 6.
- 186 N. 0. 191, 195, 119 S. E. 210, 212, 32 A. L. R. 870, 873 (1923).
10 6 Pa. 228, 230 (1847).
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not the principal obligation; so, dogmatically, its release or dis-
charge need not be in writing.31 The argument seems fairly ade-
quate as applied to the cases in which the debt is paid,82 but saying
that a mortgage is but the incident of the debt and is extinguished
with the debt by operation of law would seem to be quite different
from saying that a mortgage is but the incident of a debt and can
be released by parol though the debt remains outstanding.
The only conclusion which reasonably can be drawn from exam-
ining the cases involving the statute of frauds and the parol release
of a mortgage is that the application of the statute in a given situa-
tion is a matter of free decision. The notions at large in the cases,
operation of law, part performance, and equitable estoppel, are
notably indefinite, and they cross-cut one another in a way that
baffles prediction. Broad language is often used which gives the
appearance of settled law in a number of states. But the cases are
not numerous, and they usually leave ample room for making fact
distinctions in the future. Ample authority exists both for applying
and for not applying the statute in any probable situation. In the
law of security relationships any lack of certainty is presumably a
defect. However, in these cases, we may guess there is a compen-
sating virtue in flexibility and the supple handling of the debatable
policy underlying the statute of frauds.
Most of the cases centering around the problem of the parol
release of a mortgage are of rather early vintage. Two recent cases
will demonstrate that the courts are today no nearer agreement on
principle or result than ever.
In the Massachusetts case of Duff v. United, States Trust Co.,83
mortgages covered a tract of land divided into lots, on each of which
a house was proposed to be built. Allegedly, the defendant bank,
as mortgagee, orally agreed to release each lot as sold, if the buyer
would place a new mortgage with the bank, insured with the Federal
Housing Administration. The court held that the agreement, if
made, was unenforceable, as it was a contract for the sale of lands
and thus within the statute of frauds.
In the California case of Benavides v. White,3 4 plaintiff, a judg-
ment creditor of one Trowler, wished to satisfy his judgment out
of property owned by Trowler, of which property Trowler had exe-
31 See Riley v. Atherton, supra, note 17.
32 Southerin v. Mendurn, 5 N. H. 420 (1831).
"327 Mass. 17, 97 N. E. 2d 189 (1951).
,94 Cal. App. 2d 849, 211 P. 2d 597 (1949).
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cuted a deed of trust to defendant. In consideration of plaintiff's
oral promise to pay to defendant the six hundred-dollar debt owed
him by Trowler, defendant orally agreed to cancel the deed of trust.
Relying on the promise plaintiff levied against the property incur-
ring expense. Defendant then refused to carry out the deal. Judg-
ment was affirmed for plaintiff. The opinion of the court consumed
only a few lines of print; its sole rationale was that the evidence
seemed to support plaintiff's contention that "no agreement for the
sale of a trust deed is involved." The court made no further ex-
planation of its decision, succumbing, as it would appear from the
concluding sentence of the opinion, to an understandable temptation
to avoid entirely this tough problem:
"It would serve no useful purpose to recite all of details;
it is sufficient to note that a review of the record reveals
sufficient evidence to support the judgment and the statute
of frauds, in the light of the trial court's view of the evi-
dence, does not apply.'"35
1194 Cal. App. 2d 849, 850, 211 P. 2d 597, 598 (1949).
